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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This case involves the liability of an individual Guarantor
under the specific provisions of a Guaranty Agreement entered
between the Respondent, C. A. Bailey and the Appellant, Spanish
Trail.

The issues to be determined are as follows:
I.

Does the failure of Spanish Trail to fulfill the

conditions of paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement act as a release
of the Guarantor?
II.

Does a modification of the contract without the approval

of the Guarantor operate to release the Guarantor from liability
under the terms of the Guaranty Contract?
III.

Is the Guarantor estopped from claiming a release based

upon substitution of collateral or modification of the contract?
IV.

Does the substitution of collateral without the approval

of the Guarantor operate to release the Guarantor from liability
under the terms of the Guaranty contract?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
This is a suit alleging breach of contract, promissory
note and seeking to enforce the terms of a Guaranty.

Judgment

was entered in favor of Spanish Trail against Carrier Brokers
for breach of contract and failure to pay a promissory note.
Judgment was entered in favor of Spanish Trail against J. M.
Stoof on his guaranty of the agreement between Spanish Trail
and Carrier Brokers.

Those portions of the Judgment are not being

appealed.
The lower Court found that the Guarantor, C.A. Bailey, was

xeieasea from his Guaranty due to the substitution of collateral,
of which he had no knowledge.

The Court further found C.A.

Bailey free of liability because paragraph 4 of the agreement
did not pertain to the Guarantors but only to Carrier Brokers.
Bailey was also held released from the Gujaranty due to Spanish Trail's
failure to comply with the conditions of paragraph 6 of the agreement.
FACTS
On July 20, 1981 an agreement was entered into between
Spanish Trail and Brokers.

Pursuant to the terms of the agreement,

Spanish Trail agreed to loan Carrier Brokers the sum of $200,000.00
for the purchase of 60,000 cases of Coca-Cola.

The agreement

provided that Spanish Trail would be repaid $10,000.00 or twenty
percent (20%) of the profits from the sale of the Coca-Cola,
in addition to the $200,000.00 loan. Sums} not timely paid to
Spanish Trail were to bear interest at the rate of twenty-five
percent (25%) per annum.

C. A. Bailey guar anteed collection of

this agreement.
The key provisions of this agreement, as they relate to
this Appeal are paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
forth m

These paragraphs are set

their entirety as follows:
4. INTEREST. Any and all funds due Spanish
Trail under the terms of this agreement not timely
paid shall bear interest at the ijate of twenty-five
(25%) percent per annum until paid or collected. If
the terms of this agreement are breached by Carrier,
damages and any delinquency of principal shall bear
interest at the rate of twenty-five (25%) percent
per annum until principal and intlerest is fully
paid and Carrier and/or Guarantor! hereby waives its
rights of presentment,demand, protest, notice of
dishonor and extension of time without notice and
Carrier further consents to release of any security
or collateral hereunder, or any p&rt thereof, with
or without substitution.
-2-

5. PERSONAL GUARANTY. The signature of
the Guarantors hereto obligates the named
Guarantors jointly and severally to guarantee
full and faithful performance on behalf of
Carrier of all of theterms, conditions, covenants,
and agreement herein contained.
6. COLLATERAL. Carrier hereby acknowledges and agrees that the Coca-Cola is hereby pledged to Spanish Trail as collateral to
secure this agreement. Spanish Trail hereby
agrees that if it became necessary it would
first pursue and exhaust its remedy for repayment of any funds due it by taking the CocaCola without Court Order and selling same in
any reasonable commercial fashion. Carrier
upon default or its breach of this agreement
hereby agrees to immediately release and convey without bond or Court Order to Spanish
Trail the Coca-Cola. Secondly Carrier pledges
as collateral its equity in its real estate by
way of a second deed of trust in and thereto
to Spanish Trail, and if necessary same will
be applied towards fulfilling this agreement
after Spanish Trail has exhausted its remedy
of using its best efforts in selling the CocaCola. Having exhausted the aforementioned
remedies and if any delinquency still exists
under the terms of this agreement then
Spanish Trail can pursue said delinquency
against the undersigned Guarantor and
Carrier either jointly or severally.
Unbeknownst to Bailey, the Agreement was subsequently modified
to change the interest rate to five percent (5%) per month
sixty percent (60%) per annum.

This modification was negotiated

between J. M. Stoof and Spanish Trail, through its agent,
Roger Mattson.

Also unbeknownst to Bailey, the agreed upon

collateral, Coca-Cola, was substituted for ice cream and frozen
fish.

This was done with the approval of Spanish Trail

[_ stoof

Deposition at pages 7 and 14/, when informed by tne manager of
Carrier, J. M. Stoof, that all of the Coca-Cola could not be
obtained.

It was at this same time that the interest rate was
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modified.

During the times in question C. A. Bailey was

the President of Carrier Brokers.

J. ML Stoof was the manager.

Stoof ran Carrier Brokers and made all of the managerial
decisions without authorization of the officers or Board
of Directors.

The testimony indicated the substitution and

modification of the agreement without the knowledge or consent of
Bailey.

Bailey first learned of thechar^ges after the fact,

when the agreement was in default.
Bailey made it clear that Spanish trjail must proceed
against the collateral before proceeding on the Guaranty
/"~ Bailey Deposition at page 10_/. Spanish Trail conceded
that it never took possession of any Coca-Cola or other
inventory.

Two trustee sales of Carrier(fs real property

were called off by Spanish Trail /_ Stoof Deposition at page 12/
A third was delayed ninety (90) days by stipulation of Spanish
Trail and Carrier Brokers.

The property was ultimately fore-

closed by Valley Bank.

-4-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Spanish Trail has failed to meet the conditions of paragraph
6 of the Guaranty Agreement.

This failure releases the Guarantor,

Bailey,from liability to the Guaranty, as compliance with the
terms is a condition precedent to proceeding against the Guarantor.
Spanish Trail andJ. M. Stoof have negotiated a substantial
modification of the agreement, thus releasing Bailey from his
personal Guaranty.
Bailey cannot be estopped from asserting his release of liability
for the reason that he had no knowledge of the changes to the agreement.
He was therefore unable to make any representations or do any acts
which would induce Spanish Trail to change their position.

The

conditional Guaranty at issue in this case contemplates a one time
transaction with a readily marketable commodity pledged as security.
The subscription of that commodity, for less marketable commodities
acts to release Bailey from his Guaranty, as the Guaranty contemplates
foreclosing against the collateral prior to proceeding against the
Guarantor.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FAILURE OF SPANISH TRAIL TO PROCEED AGAINST
THE COLLATERAL RELEASES BAILEY AS A GUARANTOR
The Guaranty in the present case is a conditional Guaranty in
that certain conditions must be met Defore the Guaranty is operable.
The intention of the parties, as set forth in paragraph 6 was clearly
that Spanish Trail must proceed against the Coca-Cola and real
property prior to proceeding against Bailey.
in Wall vs. Eccles

The Utah Supreme Court

51 Utah 247, 211 P. 702 (1922) defined both an

absolute Guaranty and a Conditional Guaranty.
Conditional Guaranty as follows:

The Court defined a

Where the Guaranty is not Enforceable
immediately upon the default of the! principal
debtor but the Guarantor is obliged "to take
some steps to fix liability upon th|e Guaranty,
sucn as diligently prosecuting the blaim
against the principal debtor, the Guaranty is
a Condition one. £ Citations Omitted^/ 211
P. at 703,.
Paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement signed by Bailey
is obviously a Conditional Guaranty.

It provides that:

Spanish Trail hereby agrees ... it would
first pursue and exhaust its remedy for repayment
of any funds due it... by taking the Coca-Cola...
and selling same. ... Secondly Carrier pledges
as collateral its equity in its real estate ...
to Spanish Trail, and if necessary same will be
applied towards fulfilling this agreement after
Spanish Trail has exhausted its remedy ... in
selling the Coca-Cola. Having exhausted the aforementioned remedies and if any delinquency still
exists ... then Spanish Trail can pursue said
delinquency against the undersigned Guarantor...
Spanish Trail must proceed against the Coca-Cola and the real estate
before pursuing Bailey.

These are conditions precedent to any

action against Bailey.

The substitution of collateral, without

the consent or the knowledge of Bailey acts to release Bailey of
any liability under the Guaranty as the conditions of paragraph 6
could no longer be met.
This Court has recognized that if the Guaranty requires the
creditor to first proceed against collateral, no action may be
maintained against the Guarantor until the condition is met. The
Court in Strevell-Patterson Co., Inc. vs. Francis

646 P.2d 741,

743 (Utah 1982) stated:
...Whether a creditor has a duty to pursue
the debtor or the security as a precondition to
action against the Guarantor "depends 'upon the nature
of the Guarantor's promise."... In coritrast, a
Guaranty of collection is conditional only, tne
Guarantor's liability being dependant upon the
creditors first exhausting its remedies against
the debtor and any security before resorting to
action against the Guarantor. (Emphasip in original,
citation omitt^H\

The Court, based upon the particular language of the Guaranty,
found the Guarantors liable on an absolute Guaranty.

However,

in this case, the particular language of the Guaranty creates
conditions that must first be met.

Because Spanish Trail did not

meet those conditions, Bailey is released from the Guaranty.

In

Behlen Manufacturing Co. vs. First National Bank of Englewood 28
Colo. App. 300, 472 P.2d 703 (1970) the Guarantor was released
because the creditor failed to take measures to perfect its
security interest in the debtorfs collateral.

The creditor

argued, as does Spanish Trail, that any such duty was waived by
the language of the Guaranty Agreement.

The Court, however, stated:

If the destruction or impairment of such
a right (of subrogation) is to be waived by a
Guarantor, it should only be by the most unequivocal
language in the Guaranty Agreement. The language
relied upon by the banks does not meet this test.
The only waiver in the Guaranty Agreement has to
do with notice of nonpayment, protest, extension of
the note and partial payment. There is no waiver
relating to the collateral. 472 P.2d at 707 through
708.
The only waiver in the present case, agreed to by the Guarantor,
is as to "presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and
extension of time without notice.1' Clearly, Spanish Trail's failure
to adhere to paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement releases the
Guarantor

Bailey, from liability.

Spanish Trail claims that it attempted to foreclose on the
real property, also taken as collateral, but was stopped from doing
so by Carrier.

Spanish Trail fails to mention that two trustees

sales were scheduled.

The first was cancelled by Spanish Trail

and on the second, Spanish Trail failed to enter any type of
bid /""Deposition of Stoof at page 1 2 J .

In addition, it made no

attempt to proceed against the Coca-Cola, or even the ice cream

and fish.

Its failure to comply with the conditions of the Guaranty

acts as a release of Bailey, the Guarantor. In Olson vs. U.S.
National BanK of Oregon, 70 Or. App. 460, 689 P.2d 1021 (1984),
the Court, construing a letter of credit, eventually the same
as the Guaranty, stated:

"The Plaintiff may not recover unless

it complies strictly with the letter of credit" 689 P.2d at 1022.
The surety in that matter was released becjause the creditor did
not comply with the terms of the Agreeemen|t.
Court m

The Utah Supreme

Powerine Co. vs. Russell, Inc. 10 3 Utah 441, 135 P.2d

906, 911 (1943), recognized the letter of credit and the Guaranty
as the same thing.

The Court also held th^t "...the Guarantor

is entitled to have his undertaking as thu^ determined strictly
construed."
Spanish Trail's failure to comply wi h the requirements of
paragraph 6 of the Agreement releases the guarantor, Bailey, from
the Guaranty,
II.
A MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT WITHdUT THE APPROVAL
OF THE GUARANTOR, BAILEY, OPERATES T<0 RELEASE HIM
FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE GUARANTY
The original Agreement contracted for an interest rate of
twenty-five percent (25%) per annum on unpaid balances.

This

Agreement was signed on the 20th day of July, 1981. Just one
month later, on the 19th day of August, 1981, this provision was
modified by Stoof and Spanish Trail to calculate interest at the
rate of five percent (5%) per month.

This amounts to an un-

consciounable interest rate of sixty percent (60%) per annum.
This modification was done without the knowledge of Bailey.
As this was a substantial change in the ternjs of the Agreement,
-8-

this also acts to release Bailey from the Guaranty,

The Court

in George E. Failing Co, vs. Cardwell Investment Co., 190
Kan. 509, 376 P.2d 892 (1962) in releasing a Guarantor stated:
Even compensated Guarantors are not liable
when the original contract on which they are
undertaking was made is materially changed
without their assent. The gratuitous or
accommodation Guarantor is discharged by any
change, material or not .... He has a right
to stand upon the very terms of his obligation and is bound no further. 376 P.2d at 898.
It is well established that the change in the terms of
the Guarantor's Agreement relieves him of his liability.

See

McBride Electric, Inc. vs. Putts Tuff, Inc. 9 Kan. App. 2d
548, 685 P.2d 316 (1984); Olson vs. U.S. National Bank of Oregon
70 Or. App. 460, 689 P.2d 1021 (1984); Farber vs. Green Shoe
Manufacturing Co. 677 P.2d 376 (Colo.App. 1983); Gandy vs. Park
National Bank 615 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1980); Kutilek vs. Union National
Bank of Wichita

213 Kan. 407, 516 P.2d 979 (1973); Jackson vs.

First National Bank of Greely 28 Colo. App. 415, 474 P.2d 640
(1970).
III.
THE GUARANTOR, BAILEY, HAVING NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
MODIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT OR THE SUBSTITUTION
OF COLLATERAL IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING A RELEASE.
Estoppel takes place when one person, through his representations or conduct, induces another person to do an act. The
actor

is estopped

tions or acts.

or prevented from disclaiming his representa-

In this case, the Guarantor, Bailey, had no

knowledge that the collateral was substituted.
that the interest rate had been renegotiated.

-9-

He had no knowledge
He therefore

could not have done anything to induce Spanish Trail to act. He cannot be estopped when he has done nothing and had no knowledge of the
events.

This is especially true since Spanish Trail negotiated

these changes with Stoof1 /""stoof Deposition page 7/-

it is

further clear from the document itself that the interest changes
were approved by Spanish Trail.
Court has stated m

As Spanish Trail points out, this

G. Eugene England Foundation vs. Smiths Food

King No. 6 542 P.2d 753 (Utah 1975) that when one of two innocent
parties must suffer a loss, it should be the one who made the
choices leading to the loss.

Certainly Bajiley made no choices as

he had no knowledge of the same.

Indeed, |in G. Eugene England,

the Defendant, Smiths, was found to be notl liable because it had
strictly honored its contractual obligations.

Here, Bailey has

honored his contractual obligation but Spanish Trail has not
honored its obligations.
Under similar facts in Iola State BaAk vs. 8iggs ^J3 Kan.
450, 662 P.2d 563 (1983) the Court released the Guarantor from
liability and further held that estoppel cduld not be claimed
by the creditor due to the Guarantor's failure to request a release
of the earlier guarantees.

A failure to act, absent a duty to

do so, was no an estoppel in that case, andj cannot be one in
the present case.
^The questioning of Mr. Stoof by SpaniL.
_ counsel
sh Trail's
went as follows: Q. Were you aware of negotiations after this
agreement came in default? A. Yes. Q. Between Carrier Brokers
and Spanish Trail? A. Yes. Q. Do part of those agreements
include some type of a fish transaction? Ai. Yes.

The fact that Bailey was President of Carrier Brokers
is of no avail.

The Guaranty is not a corporate Guaranty but

is an individual Guaranty.

If the individual does not know of

the change, he cannot be estopped from asserting a release of
the Guaranty based on those changes.
IV.
SUBSTITUTION OF COLLATERAL WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF
THE GUARANTOR, BAILEY, OPERATES TO RELEASE HIM FROM
LIABILITY UNDER THE GUARANTY
The Agreement and Guaranty in the present action
contemplates a one time transaction involving Coca-Coia.

clearly
Spanisn

Trail was to loan money for the specific purchase of Coca-Cola.
The Coca-Cola was to be sold for a profit and the money paid back
within forty (40) days.

The Coca-Cola was placed as security and

Spanish Trail was obligated to pursue the Coca-Cola prior to
proceeding against the Guarantor.

Such an Agreement is a conditional

or restricted Guaranty, as distinguished from a continuing Guaranty,
where the parties contemplate a series of transactions or a
revolving line of credit.

Any deviation from the strict terms

of the Guaranty will act to release the Guarantor.
Bank vs. Biggs,supra,

In Ioia State

233 Kan. 450, 662 P.2d 563 (1983) two

Guarantees were given guaranteeing the debts of a business.

The

buseinss was later incorporated and a third Guaranty issued.
The preincorporation loans were consolidated into one loan belonging
to the corporation. When the corporation defaulted, the creditor
sought to enforce all three guarantys.

The Court held that

consolidating the loans released the Guarnators on the first two
Guarantys.

The Court stated at 570:
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A Guarantor may be relieved of an obligation to pay if the debt is extinguished,
if there is a valid release or discharge,
if the claim against the Guarantor
rantor is bar:
barred
by the Statute of Limitations,
s, or if ther<
there
is a change in the original contract between
(Emphasis added).
the obligor and the obligee
In the present case, the substitution of fish and ice cream 1
beyond the scope of the agreement, it is a
releases Bailey from the Guarantor.

change therein and

SimiJ ar facts are found in

Webb vs. B^inger Contract Supply Co. 447 S.W. 2d 906 (Tex. 1969)
where the Guarantor was deemed discharged because of substitution
of collateral.

There the creditor was secured with the furniture

of the principal debtor, a motel.

The creditor subordinated

its

position in the furniture without the knowledge of the Guarantor.
The Court ruled this acted as a release even though the Guaranty
did not require the debtor to first pursue) the collateral.

The

Court stated:
It has been said that "the power to
modify anything does not imply the power
to substitute a thing entirely different,
and it does not confer the power to destroy"
/ Citations Omitted/ 447 S.W.2d at 908.
In the instant case, the agreement was a one time transaction
for the purchase of Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola is a well known product
with a ready resell value.

As paragraph 6 of the agreement obligat

Spanish Trail to proceed first against the collateral before
proceeding against the Guarantors, the sunscitunion of the CocaCola for ice cream and fish is a substantial change which acts
to release the Guarantor, Bailey.

This is especially true as

Stoof offered to return the balance of the loan proceeds when
no more Coca-Cola was available,but Spanish
the substitution of collateral with Stoof

Trail negotiated

/[Stoof Deposition

page 7, 14 __/, but without the knowledge of Bailey.
Spanish Trail argues that the agreement contemplated a
substitution of collateral and should therefore be enforced.
Spanish Trail cites to paragraph 4 of the agreement for this
proposition.

Under paragraph 4,Bailey, the Guarantor, has

clearly waived his rights to "presentment, demand, protest,
notice of dishonor and extension of time without notice'1 where
the document reads "Carrier and/or Guarantor hereby waives its
right" to those protections.

However, Bailey did not waive his

rights or consent that Spanish Trail may release or substitute
security.

Paragraph 4 continues by saying:

"...Carrier

further consents to release of any security or collateral
hereunder, or any part thereof, with or without substutition."
(Emphasis Added).

If this were to include Bailey, the provision

would have read "Carrier and/or Guarantor", as the earlier provision nad done.

Spanish Trail could have inserted that language

in the contract and could have insisted that it remain and cannot
now complain that it erred when the agreement was signed.
Spanish Trail erroneously relies on this Court's recent
decision m

Continental Bank & Trust Co. vs. Utah Security Mortgage

Inc. 11 U.A.R. 38 (Utah 1985).

That case dealt with the issues

of whether the creditor had to preserve and/or proceed against
collateral before proceeding against the Guarantors.

Furthermore,

the Guarantors had expressly agreed that the creditor need not
protect or proceed first against the collateral.

Such is not the

agreement in the present case.
Because of substitution of collateral is a substantial change
in the terms of the agreement, done without the knowledge of the
-13-

Guarantor Bailey, Bailey has been released from the Guaranty and
his liability thereunder as a matter of l|aw.
V.
CONCLUSION

Paragraph 6 of the Guaranty Agreement obligates Spanish
Trail to proceed against collateral prior to proceeding against
the Guarantor.

The Guarantor is entitled to have the Guaranty

strictly construed.

Since Spanish Trailflailedto meet the conditions

of the Guaranty, the Guarantor has been released.
Spanish Trail, without the knowledge of Bailey, the Guarantor,
modified the agreement to increase the interest rate from twentyfive percent (25%) per annum to sixty percent (60%) per annum.
Such a change is a substantial modification and acts to release
the Guarantor who has not consented to the alterations.
There can be no estoppel since Bailey had no knowledge and
performed no acts inducing Spanish Trail to substitute collateral
and modify the interest rate. Furthermore, Spanish Trail has
caused its own predicament by consenting tq the modifications
with Stoof.
The substitution of collateral, withok it B a i l e y ' s knowledge,
also acts as a release.

This one time transaction contemplated that

a readily marketable commodity would be purchased.

That

commodity had to be foreclosed prior to proceeding against the
Guarantor.

The substitution of that collateral for less marketable

commodities acts to release the Guarantor.

-14-

The act of Spanish Trail had the legal effect of releasing
the individual liability of Bailey, who conditionally guaranteed
the performance of the agreement.

The lower Court, after hearing

the evidence, correctly ruled that Bailey was released and that
decision should be affirmed.
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